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Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between ﬁnancial intermediation
and employment. We explain why some economies have low ﬁnancial interme-
diation even when ﬁnancial intermediation is safe. Moreover, we seek to explain
why these economies tend to be poor and vulnerable, and also have large self-
employment even when the latter has low productivity. We model safe but
unsound banks and show that the eﬀects of bad banking can be overcome only
partially by corrective taxes. The model is extended to incorporate the illegal
sector of the economy as well as the labor laws.
Key words: Financial intermediation, self-employment, tax, labor laws.
JEL Classiﬁcation No.: G20, J23, O17.1 Introduction
This work was motivated by two stylized facts regarding less developed countries
(LDCs from now on), poor ﬁnancial development and the low level of formal
sector employment. We use a simple theoretical model to examine the linkages
between these two aspects.
That the level of ﬁnancial development in LDCs is relatively low compared
to that in developed countries is well known. Private credit, for example, is less
than 25% of GDP in low income countries. In high income countries, the cor-
responding minimum ﬁgure exceeds 50% (the maximum ﬁgure exceeds 110%).
Similarly, market capitalization is less than 20% in LDCs, whereas it lies be-
tween 20% and 80% in high income countries (World Bank, 2001). There is
also evidence to show that ﬁnancial depth is positively correlated with growth
(World Bank, 2001, p. 5-6). Moreover, there is some evidence on causality
as well. It has been shown that the causality runs from ﬁnancial development
to the real sector (e.g. Levine, et al. , 2000, and Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Greenwood and Smith (1997), Levine (1997), and Levine and Zervos (1998)
discuss the interlinkages between the real sector and the ﬁnancial sector. This
paper further explores the relationship between these two sectors.
The second stylized fact in the context of LDCs is that employment in the
formal sector, sometimes also called the organized sector, is relatively small e.g.
it is less than 10% in India (see Government of India, 2002). The bulk of the
work force is engaged in the informal sector, unlike in the case of developed
countries1. The informal sector is characterized by self-employment.
The literature has, however, treated the two phenomena of low employment
in the formal sector and little ﬁnancial intermediation as if they are unrelated.
In a series of papers, it has been shown that investor protection is important
for ﬁnancial markets (e.g. Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002, and La Porta et al.
, 2002). This literature suggests that ﬁnancial development is low if investor
protection is low. This is indeed the case in LDCs. Similarly, while studying
the low level of formal sector employment in LDCs, the emphasis has been
mainly on the artiﬁcially high levels of wages,2 absence of infrastructure, the
1The share of non-corporate businesses in total assets in USA in 1998 was 10.4% (p. 186,
Table 5.1, Bertant and StarrMcCluer, chapter 5 in Guiso et al, 2002). Percentage of households
with holdings in business equity in 1998 in USA was 11.5% (p. 190, Table 5.3, op. cit.)
2In the Harris-Todaro model, for example, such high wages can be attributed to govern-
1inappropriate choice of technology3 etc.
In this paper we seek to ﬁll this gap in the literature by examining the inter-
connections between low employment in the formal sector and little ﬁnancial
intermediation. Our hypothesis is that ﬁnancial intermediation increases with
the level of formal sector employment. The basic idea is as follows. When
economic agents get regular wage employment, they deposit their wealth in a
bank. Otherwise they go in for self-employment, using up their wealth to set up
an owner managed enterprise (OME from now on). So they deposit a smaller
fraction of their wealth in banks. Hence, bank deposits depend on the volume
of formal sector employment. This linkage will play an important role in our
analysis. This relationship, as far as we are aware, has not been explored in the
literature.
While most of our arguments apply to ﬁnancial intermediation in general,
our analysis was, to a large extent, motivated by the problems facing the bank-
ing sector. One justiﬁcation is that in the LDCs the banking sector is much
more important compared to non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries and the ﬁnan-
cial market. This can be attributed, at least partially, to the fact that there is
reasonably strong protection of an investor as a bank depositor,4 as compared
to protection of an investor as an equity or (non-bank) debt holder. Henceforth,
we will refer to banking and ﬁnancial intermediation interchangeably.
In the context of the ineﬃciencies in ﬁnancial intermediation, one factor that
has received considerable attention is the large volume of non-performing assets
(NPAs from now on) in the banking sector. While NPAs undoubtedly constitute
a serious problem, their importance may have been somewhat over-estimated.
Leaving aside the distributional issues, NPAs are a serious problem if they are
accompanied by allocative ineﬃciency. Since the issue is allocative ineﬃciency
and not NPAs per se, we may, for simplicity, abstract from NPAs and focus on
allocative ineﬃciency. Accordingly, we consider a scenario where there are no
mental regulations or the presence of uninonized labor in the formal sector. Of course, the
formal sector sometimes deliberately pays a higher wage rate so as to attract the best quality
labor, or to reduce labor turn-over (see Ray (1998)).
3See Sen (1968) on the debate regarding the choice of appropriate technology.
4The reason is the presence of public sector banks or deposit insurance. State banks are
more common in low income countries (Figure 5, p. 15, World Bank). Moreover, deposit in-
surance coverage is relatively generous in low income countries. The ratio of deposit insurance
coverage to per capita GDP is more than 6 in India as compared to a ﬁgure of less than 4 for
USA (p. 108, World Bank, 2001)
2NPAs but there is, nevertheless, allocative ineﬃciency.
There has been some literature on the role of the banking sector in the econ-
omy (see Allen and Gale (2000), and others5). Most of these papers, however,
deal with developed economies. The usual framework is that of competition
among banks and government regulations that drive managers to behave rea-
sonably responsibly, barring some agency cost due to non-veriﬁable action. In
this paper, however, we are concerned with a scenario in which public sector
banks (PSBs from now on) dominate the banking sector. The crucial assump-
tion is that there is a big separation between ownership and management in the
bank. Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), this problem is well recognized
in the literature in the context of the corporate sector. In the context of the
PSBs, the problem due to separation of ownership and management gets fur-
ther aggravated. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, monitoring of the bank
managers by the owner viz. the government is weaker than in the case of the
(private) corporate sector. Secondly, bank managers are public sector oﬃcials
who can rarely be dismissed. This fact makes the bank managers more bold.
Thirdly, in most LDCs, a borrower has, for all practical purposes, no access
to the judiciary even if she can prove that she deserves to get a loan and has
not got one (without bribing the bank oﬃcials). In this paper we focus on one
particular manifestation of such self-serving behavior by bank managers, forcing
the entrepreneurs to select ineﬃcient projects. While this aspect of banking is
well known in the literature, the implications of this behavior seem to have been
underestimated. Usually it is assumed that deposits are given exogenously so
that the nature of banking aﬀects only the allocation of given deposits. We
will show that deposits are endogenous and therefore, the implications of bad
banking are more serious than they are usually thought to be.
Our framework is as follows. Consider an agent with some endowment of
labor and capital. Suppose she has a job. She will obviously look for an optimal
portfolio for her capital. This is the standard ﬁnance problem. But now suppose
that she is, instead, unemployed and is likely to remain one. Will she forget her
unemployment and consider the issue of optimal portfolio, or will she consider
a portfolio that allows her to take care of both the wealth aspect as well as
the employment aspect? We may refer to this as the ﬁnance-cum-employment
5Diamond, D., 1984, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Stiglitz (1985, 1993), Bencivenga and
Smith (1991), and so on.
3problem. Investment in ﬁnancial assets solves only her problem of choice of
optimal portfolio. But she has another, possibly more, serious problem. She is
unemployed! So it is the ﬁnance-cum-employment problem that is relevant and
not the standard ﬁnance problem. The latter is a familiar problem (following
Markowitz, 1952). But the former is not. The question is - what solves the
ﬁnance-cum-employment problem? Can an agent invest in such a way that
there is a job as well as an optimal combination of risk6 and return on capital?
Yes, provided she invests little (possibly zero, as in our model) in ﬁnancial
assets and mostly in an OME in which she has a job. She is, in other words,
self-employed. This is a typical LDC problem. This is where it diﬀers from the
standard ﬁnance problem that is relevant in the context of a developed country.
We build a simple model comprising three classes of agents viz. an en-
trepreneur, a bank and households. The entrepreneur has two projects that
require labor and capital. The entrepreneur has zero endowment of both labor
and capital and must borrow money from the capital market and hire labor from
the labor market, if she wants to start either project. A household is endowed
with both labor and capital and, as mentioned before, she also has access to an
OME which requires some capital investment, as well as labor. She can either
opt for wage employment and put her wealth in the bank, or she can opt for
the OME and invest the whole of her capital and labor in the OME.
The entrepreneur has access to two projects, good and bad, where the good
project is more productive compared to the bad one. The bad project, however,
yields a private beneﬁt to the entrepreneur. Moreover, in case the bad project
is chosen, the bank manager obtains a fraction of the private beneﬁts accruing
to the entrepreneur. We begin by showing that compared to the ﬁrst best, the
outcome is sub-optimal. This ineﬃciency can be traced to two sources. First,
the choice of the bad, rather than the good project. Second, even under the
bad project, the level of formal sector employment is less than optimal.
We then demonstrate that the linkage between formal sector employment
and the volume of ﬁnancial intermediation plays a critical role in exacerbating
these ineﬃciencies. If the volume of ﬁnancial intermediation was independent
of the volume of formal sector employment, then the ineﬃciencies would have
been much less.
6The treatment of risk is familiar in the literature. So we abstract from risk altogether in
our simple model in order to focus on issues that are less familiar in the literature.
4The above analysis also throws some light on one very important question:
Why is one country rich, while another is poor? We show that the cost of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation can explain diﬀerences in income across countries. Another
issue is that, in some cases, the developed countries tend to be less vulnerable
than the LDCs to ﬁnancial distress. For example, in the 1980s, the USA went
through the savings and loan crises but it did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the econ-
omy. Again, in 1987, there was a stock market crash in the USA which hardly
aﬀected the economy. On the other hand, in the case of East Asia in late 1990s,
the ﬁnancial crises had considerable impact on the real sector. Our analysis
suggests the following answer. In developed countries most of the economy is
in the formal sector. Unless the shock is relatively large, this continues to be
the case even after the shock. Since the size of the formal sector is not aﬀected,
neither is the volume of ﬁnancial intermediation, given our hypothesis. Hence
the economy is not aﬀected. For LDCs, however, with ﬁnancial distress the size
of the formal sector declines, leading to a further fall in the volume of ﬁnancial
intermediation.
We then introduce taxes into the model. The objective is to see if taxation
policy can be used to rectify some of the ineﬃciencies associated with bad
banking. We ﬁnd that, up to a level, an increase in the tax rate increases
formal sector employment and thus improves welfare. This is interesting given
the fact that tax policies are generally associated with a shrinkage in formal
sector employment.
This result, however, needs to be qualiﬁed on several grounds. First, while
low level of taxes may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect, tax rates that are too high would
lead to a decrease in social welfare. Second, taxes cannot resolve one problem,
the fact that under bad banking the bad project is selected. Finally, consider
another scenario where the bad project can be produced either in the legal, or
in the illegal sector (which does not pay any taxes). In this version we show
that an increase in tax rates may result in production being shifted to the less
productive illegal sector, thus leading to a fall in welfare. Consequently, one
needs to be very careful before suggesting that tax policies can be used as a
cure for bad banking.
Another stylized feature of LDCs is the presence of labor laws, e.g. minimum
wage regulations. We show that the presence of such regulations would also
stiﬂe the expansion of the formal sector. Our analysis also throws some light on
5the observed high capital intensity of production in the formal sector (see, for
example, Mathur, 1991 and Fallor, et al.. , 1993).
Interestingly we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of bad banking is diﬀerent from the
eﬀect of taxation and labor laws. While all three contribute to making the
informal sector large, bad banking shifts activity from the entrepreneur to self-
employment, whereas taxes and labor laws shift activity from the legal sphere
(in the formal sector) to the illegal sphere (in the informal sector). But it is
still directed by the entrepreneur. So the small share of the formal sector in an
LDC is not a true reﬂection of the role of the entrepreneur in LDCs. It is not
as small as would be indicated by the share of the formal sector. A part of the
informal sector is also run by the entrepreneur. Similarly, there is considerable
wage employment in the informal sector. So again the small size of employment
in the formal sector is misleading. But there is an ineﬃciency nevertheless. This
is due to the cost of operating in the illegal sphere of the informal sector.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the basic model.
Section 3 solves the basic model and examines the role of the endogenous supply
of deposits. Section 4 shows that a corrective tax scheme cannot fully overcome
the eﬀects of bad banking. Section 5 extends the model to include the illegal
sector. Section 6 examines the implications of labor laws. We conclude in
section 7.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a simple one period model with a single homogeneous output.
The price of this good is normalized to 1. The model comprises three classes
of agents viz. an entrepreneur, a bank, and households. The entrepreneur has
two projects. Each project requires labor and capital. We make the simplifying
assumption that she has zero endowment of both labor and capital. Thus if she
wants to start a project, she must borrow funds and hire labor. The entrepreneur
can invest in either one of two projects, G or B. Project returns are divided into
two parts, veriﬁable and non-veriﬁable. Project G yields a veriﬁable return of
gf(K,L) and no non-veriﬁable income, where K and L denote, respectively, the
amount of capital and labor employed by the entrepreneur. Project B yields
a veriﬁable return of bf(K,L) and a non-veriﬁable income of pf(K,L). The
latter can be interpreted as the private beneﬁt of the entrepreneur. This may
6be viewed as tunneling (Johnson, et al. , 2000). The private beneﬁt can be
interpreted as the entrepreneur diverting a part of the output for private use.
The amount of capital and labor actually used in the project is veriﬁable, so that
diverting capital or labor for private use is not possible. Project G (respectively
B) is a good (respectively bad) project. Hence we assume that, for any given K
and L, the aggregate return from the good project exceeds that under the bad
project. Formally, we have
Assumption 1. g > b + p.
The situation that we are trying to model is where there are a number of
identical, public sector banks operating in the formal sector. These banks collect
deposits from the households and disburse loans to the entrepreneur. We will
consider one representative bank.
In this paper, it is our objective to analyze the eﬀects of ‘bad’ banking.
Clearly, bad banking can have many dimensions. One well known aspect is that
of NPAs. Another problem is that of idle capacity. In recent years a lot of eﬀort
has been devoted towards analyzing policies that take care of these problems7.
We would like to argue that while both these problems are important, these does
not capture all potential problems associated with ‘bad’ banking. Accordingly,
we assume in our model that there are no NPAs.8 We will write the zero NPA
condition formally later. The banks have no access to outside capital, thus the
loan disbursement cannot exceed the deposits, so that K ≤ D where K denotes
loans by the bank and D represents deposits. Further, assume that there is no
idle capacity. Formally, we have
K = D. (1)
While in this model the no idle capacity condition is imposed by ﬁat, it is
not too diﬃcult to endogenously derive this result in a larger model. One way
would be to assume that the banker uses her bargaining power to ensure that
the entrepreneur takes the whole of the deposits as loans. Alternatively, one
can impose parameter restrictions that ensure that the entrepreneurs want to
7In India, both the laws and enforcement of recovery of loans have been made tougher in
recent times. The ratio of NPAs to assets has marginally come down in the last few years
(Datar, 2002).
8Assumption 4 later ensures that the equilibrium does not involve any NPAs.
7borrow the whole of the deposits lying with the bank. Finally, it is possible to
derive the same result if the government imposes this condition on public sector
banks and the entrepreneur internalizes this fact when deciding how much to
borrow. However, we abstract from all these aspects since these do not add to
the essentials of our analysis.
We assume that bank oﬃcials force the entrepreneur to select the bad project.
The bank management obtains a part of the private beneﬁt from this project i.e.
(1−α)pf(K,L), while the entrepreneur obtains αpf(K,L), where 0 < α < 1 is
an index of the bargaining power of the entrepreneur.9 Moreover, both the bank
management and the entrepreneur know the identity of the projects. Further,
the bank manager gets a private beneﬁt only if the entrepreneur chooses the
bad project.
There are a number of identical households of mass 1. Every household has
an endowment consisting of 1 unit of labor and 1 unit of capital. Given that
the households have a mass of 1, the total labor endowment in the economy
equals 1 and the total capital endowment in the economy is also 1. So we have
the following feasibility condition:
L,K ≤ 1. (2)
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that every household consists of exactly
one agent. For simplicity, we assume that they have equal endowments, and
that an owner-managed enterprise requires 1 unit each of labor and capital.
It is not diﬃcult to extend the model to allow for unequal endowments across
households (including zero capital for some households).10 In that case, there
9The exact value of α would depend on various things, e.g. the bargaining power of the
entrepreneur vis-a-vis the bank management, the nature of the technology, the social norms
etc. For our model we assume that α is exogenously given.
10There is a large section of the work force in many LDCs that does not have, for all
practical purposes, any capital. They are usually referred to as landless labor, rather than
‘capital-less’ labor (given the perceived signiﬁcance of land relative to capital in an LDC).
How does our model take care of this? Self-employment can take various forms. Consider
casual laborers in many LDCs at, say, railway stations or ports. They are self-employed and
this activity hardly requires any capital. Similarly, hawkers, vendors, cobblers, and so on are
all self-employed with negligible capital. Our model assumed that each household has one
unit of capital. This may be looked at as an average size. As compared to the landless or
capital-less self-employed households, there would be others at the other end of the spectrum
who would have ‘large’ capital which is used in their owner-managed enterprises. These would
be the so-called small-scale enterprises, retail trades, etc. in the cities and the capital could
8would be owner-managed enterprises of varying sizes in the informal sector.
Every household has two options, either to work as self-employed, or to work
as a laborer with the entrepreneur and invest her capital optimally.
Consider a typical household. If she decides to be self-employed then she
can operate an OME which requires at least 1 unit each of labor and capital.
Whenever both the input levels are at least 1, the net return from this technology
is s(> 0). This technology is ineﬃcient compared to the best practice technology
available in the formal sector. Formally we assume that the aggregate output
under project G is higher compared to that in the OME if both the technologies
employ 1 unit each of labor and capital.
Assumption 2. gf(1,1) > s.
Thus we assume that the entrepreneur is more eﬃcient than the self-employed
agents. Alternatively, a household can work as a laborer in the formal sector and
earn a wage of w. Since direct lending from the households to the entrepreneur
is ruled out by assumption, the household deposits her 1 unit of capital with
the bank and earns a rental income of r.11 Thus the total income accruing to
a household from working in the formal sector and depositing her capital in
the bank is w + r. In order to ensure that the equilibrium involves some of the
households opting for employment in the formal sector, we assume that s > r.
For simplicity we assume that the households have neither any disutility
from working, nor any utility from leisure. Thus for a household her utility
maximization exercise simpliﬁes to income maximization. Consider a typical
household. Her income from self-employment is s, whereas her eﬀective income
from working as a laborer is w+r. For simplicity, we assume that only earnings
matter i.e. there is no disutility from self-employment or wage employment.
So an agent is indiﬀerent between wage employment and self-employment if
earnings are equal. Hence, her labor supply curve is given by
run into fairly respectable amounts in some cases. These kinds of enterprises may even have
extra capital that is invested in ﬁnancial assets or real estate. These would also be employing
labor. For the purpose of our model, we may club the employees and the employer together
in the category of informal sector.
11Thus the implicit assumption is that the household sector does not have a storage tech-




0, if s > w + r,
l, where l{0,1}, if s = w + r,
1, if s < w + r.
Thus the aggregate labor supply is 0, if s > w + r, and it is 1, if s < w + r
since the measure of work force is 1. If s = w+r, then the labor supply (L) can
take any value in the interval [0,1].
We use the supply curve for labor to generate the supply curve for bank
deposits. Note that in this model the households who work in the formal sector
are the only source of capital for the entrepreneur who borrows from the bank.
The capital of the self-employed households are used up in their own OMEs.
We have, for simplicity, assumed that the supply of deposits from other sources





0, if s > w + r,
L, if s = w + r,
1, if s < w + r.
(3)
Next, we describe the sequence of actions in this economy. Depending on
whether it is a case of good banking or bad banking, the entrepreneur decides
whether to opt for project G or project B. The households’ optimization exercise
generates the supply schedules of labor and capital. Given the project choice
and the supply schedules, the entrepreneur’s optimization yields the equilibrium
level of labor and capital.
We assume that r is given exogenously. The entrepreneur chooses (w,L,K)
subject to the participation constraint of the households i.e. w + r ≥ s. In
equilibrium13,
w + r = s. (4)
12Note that there is a similarity between our model and Clower (1965). The latter had
interpreted Keynes’ General Theory as a case of feedback from the labor market to the goods
market. Similarly, in our model, there is a feedback from the labor market to the ﬁnancial
sector. In Clower (1965), when unemployment is high, there is low demand for goods. In our
model, when self-employment (instead of unemployment) is high, then there is low supply of
deposits to the banks. Note that there is a similarity between our model and Clower (1965).
The latter had interpreted Keynes’ General Theory as a case of feedback from the labor market
to the goods market. Similarly, in our model, there is a feedback from the labor market to
the ﬁnancial sector. In Clower (1965), when unemployment is high, there is low demand for
goods. In our model, when self-employment (instead of unemployment) is high, then there is
low supply of deposits to the banks.
13Let Lg and wg denote the equilibrium level of employment and wage respectively. Suppose
10From (3) and (4), it follows that in equilibrium, D = L. Using (1), it follows
that
K = L. (5)
For most of the next section, we will work with a general production function
f(L.K) with the only restriction that it is symmetric. Formally,
Assumption 3. fL(L.K),fK(L.K) > 0,fLL(L.K),fKK(L.K) < 0 and
fLL(a,a) + fLK(a,a) < 0,∀a > 0. Moreover, f(y,z) = f(z,y),∀y,z > 0.
Note that the condition that f(y,z) = f(z,y), for all y,z implies that
fL(y,z) = fK(z,y) for all y,z. Assumption 3 is satisﬁed, for example, for all
production function of the form f(K,L) = (KL)α, where α < 1
2. In this paper,
in some cases, we will use the following speciﬁc symmetric production function
to get explicit solutions.
Assumption 3
0
. f(K,L) = (KL)1/4.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the bank has zero NPA. Given the
zero proﬁt condition for the bank, this implies that the entrepreneur repays
the loan fully. This is possible only if the veriﬁable income of the entrepreneur
satisﬁes the following condition:
bf(K,L) − wL − rK ≥ 0 (6)
This, we will see, is true under the following assumption.
Assumption 4. b ≥ αp.
Note that the no NPA condition ensures that both the bank and the house-
holds are going to be paid in equilibrium. Thus we do not need to address the
question as to who has the ﬁrst claim in case of bankruptcy, labor or capital.
It is possible to consider an alternative model in which b and p are endoge-
nous. In that case, the entrepreneur faces a trade oﬀ. A higher p increases the
non-veriﬁable return, but it decreases the total return from the project. More-
over, if the entrepreneur chooses a high p, her veriﬁable return will be low. In
to the contrary that wg > s − r. If the entrepreneur announces a wage rate of wg − , where
wg − ≥ s−r, then, for the same value of Lg, the entrepreneur’s proﬁt will be strictly higher.
11that case, she may not be able to repay her loan. Ex ante, she will not get a
loan from a bank which is seriously avoiding NPAs. Clearly, the entrepreneur
would like to take the loan. So it is reasonable to assume that p is chosen at an
intermediate level. However, since this formulation does not add too much to
the economics of the paper, we refrain from analyzing this case, either for the
basic model, or in case of the later extensions.
3 Bad Banking and The Endogenous Supply of
Deposits
We begin by solving for the ﬁrst best outcome. This serves as a benchmark for
the equilibrium analysis. Clearly, under the ﬁrst best outcome there must be
no idle capacity. Thus the whole of the capital must be invested, and all labor
must be utilized. Moreover, given Assumption 1, project G must be chosen
in the formal sector. Since L is the employment level in the formal sector, it
follows that the volume of labor engaged in self-employment in the ﬁrst best case
is (1 − L). Given the technology, the output in the informal sector is (1 − L)s.
Note that the amount of capital employed in the informal sector is exactly equal
to employment, i.e. 1 − L. Thus, in the formal sector L = K. Thus the ﬁrst
best solves the following program
max
L,K
gf(K,L) + (1 − L)s s.t. K = L ≤ 1. (7)
Let (Lg,Kg) denote the ﬁrst best solution. Clearly, the second order con-
dition is satisﬁed, given Assumption 3. Next, let us consider the market equi-
librium outcome. We begin by solving for the entrepreneur’s problem. The
entrepreneur prefers project G to project B since g > b + p. But the loan from
the bad bank is available only if project B is selected since the bank manage-
ment can be paid out of the non-veriﬁable income only. So the entrepreneur
chooses the good (respectively bad) project if the bank is good (respectively
bad). Given the project choice, the entrepreneur chooses w, K and L optimally
so as to maximize her own proﬁt. We assume that r is given exogenously. The
households act as price-takers in both the labor and the capital market. There
are two cases to consider, ﬁrst when the entrepreneur chooses project G (if
there is good banking), and second when she chooses project B (if there is bad
banking).
12Project G. Suppose that the entrepreneur employs L units of labor and
borrows K units of capital from the bank. Then, the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem is to maximize gf(K,L)−wL−rK subject to the feasibility condition
and the zero NPA condition. So we may re-write the optimization problem as
max
L,K
gf(K,L) − sL s.t. K = L ≤ 1 and gf(K,L) − sL ≥ 0. (8)
In case of project G, the proﬁt of the bank is zero and the bank management
does not obtain any private beneﬁt. Using assumptions 2 and 3, it follows that
gf(K,L)−sL ≥ 0. So the problem in (8) is essentially the same as (7). Hence,
the ﬁrst best outcome can be attained under good banking.
Project B. The decision problem facing the entrepreneur is similar to that
in the case of the good project. We have
max
L,K
(b + αp)f(K,L) − sL s.t. K = L ≤ 1 and bf(K,L) − sL ≥ 0. (9)
Note that the zero NPA condition involves bf(K,L) − sL ≥ 0 and not (b +
αp)f(K,L)−sL ≥ 0, because only the veriﬁable output can be used for repaying
the bank loan. Let (Lb,Kb) denote the solution. Note that (Lb,Kb) does not
lead to bankruptcy provided the veriﬁable income is suﬃcient to cover the rental
and the wage bills. This simpliﬁes to the condition that b ≥ αp, which, given
Assumption 4, is satisﬁed. Since (b + αp) < (b + p) < g, it follows immediately
from the comparison of optimization in (8) and (9) that the solution is not the
ﬁrst best i.e. xb < xg. Observe that Lb ≤ Lg, where Lb = Lg is possible if the
constraint L ≤ 1 is binding. Let xb and xg denote the aggregate output under
bad banking and under good banking respectively. We have, thus, established
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Under good banking, the ﬁrst
best outcome can be attained. Under bad banking, the outcome is sub-optimal
i.e. xb < xg, and the equilibrium level of employment in the formal sector is
less than or equal to that under the ﬁrst best outcome i.e. Lb ≤ Lg.
It is easy to show that the ﬁrst best outcome can also be attained if the
entrepreneur has direct access to capital (and labor) from households. It is also
easy to check that under Assumption 3
0
,












xb = (b + p)f(Kb,Lb) + (1 − Lb)s < xg = gf(Kg,Lg) + (1 − Lg)s. (11)
We then use our model to comment on a very important question - why are
some countries rich, while others are poor?
We need to introduce a few notations before we can formally address this
question. It is easy to see that there exists ˆ α14 such that the equilibrium level
of employment in the formal sector equals 1 if α ≥ ˆ α, it is ˆ L otherwise, where
ˆ L solves the equation15 (see ﬁgure 1)
2(b + αp)fL(L,K) = s. (12)
We may interpret (1 − α) as the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation. If (1 − α) >
(1 − ˆ α), then part of the labor force is employed in the informal sector. For
reasons that will become clear soon, we interpret (1 − ˆ α) as the threshold of
vulnerability.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Consider two countries which are identical in every respect except the cost
of intermediation. Let country A (respectively B) be characterized by αA (re-
spectively αB). Suppose that αA > b α > αB. Thus country B has a greater cost
of ﬁnancial intermediation. Note that in country A the whole of the labor force
is in the formal sector, whereas in country B it is divided among the formal and
the informal sectors. From ﬁgure 1 it immediately follows that the welfare level
in country A is greater than that in B, i.e. xA > xB, where xA and xB are the
aggregate output in country A and in country B respectively.
Moreover, it is often suggested that LDCs tend to be more vulnerable to
deterioration in ﬁnancial sector as compared to developed countries. Why? In
the context of our model, in country A, if (1 − α) increases (up to a point i.e.
1 − ˆ α), output is not aﬀected. But in country B, a rise in 1 − α aﬀects output
14Note that ˆ α is given by
2(b + ˆ αp)fL(1,1) = s.
It is easy to check that 0 < (1 − ˆ α) < 1 if and only if s1 < s < s2, where s1 ≡ 2bfL(1,1), and
s2 ≡ 2(b + p)fL(1,1).
15This equation follows from the ﬁrst order condition after using L = K and fL = fK. Note
that for α ≥ ˆ α, L = 1, i.e. self-employment is zero and all employment is in the formal sector.
14adversely. We will use − ∂x
∂(1−α) as the measure of vulnerability of an economy
to a deterioration in ﬁnancial intermediation. Formally, − ∂x
B
∂(1−α) > − ∂x
A
∂(1−α) =
0. So country B is not only poor, but it is also vulnerable to deterioration
in ﬁnancial intermediation. Thus despite both the countries having the same
endowment and technology, greater cost of ﬁnancial intermediation in country
B implies that it is poorer, as well as more vulnerable compared to country A.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have
Proposition 2. Consider countries A and B which are identical in every
respect except that αA > b α > αB. Let Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 hold. Then
xA > xB. Moreover, while country B is vulnerable to any increase in the cost
of ﬁnancial intermediation, country A is not. Further, given Assumption 3
0
,
vulnerability of B decreases as the productivity of the informal sector rises.
The formal proofs of Proposition 2 and the remaining propositions that
follow are given in the appendix.
Our model suggests that developed countries are not vulnerable unless the
shock is very large (i.e. 1 − α increases beyond 1 − ˆ α). For example, in the
context of the Great Depression of 1930s, Bernanke (1983) suggests that the
weaknesses in the ﬁnancial sector were large enough to aﬀect the real sector in
USA.
In what follows, we drop the superscript (A,B), where it is understood that
we are dealing with the case of an LDC i.e. α < b α. Consider now comparative
statics on s. What is the eﬀect of a change in the productivity in the informal
sector on vulnerability of an economy? Formally, how does ∂x
∂(1−α) change with
respect to s? It is easy to check that ∂
2x
∂s∂(1−α) > 0. In other words, the
magnitude of vulnerability ( − ∂x
∂(1−α)) decreases as s increases. The intuition is
straightforward. A shock in the ﬁnancial sector adversely aﬀects the economy. It
results in a shift of allocation from the (eﬃcient) formal sector to the (ineﬃcient)
informal sector. In such a situation, it helps to have high productivity in the
informal sector. The higher is s, the less is the impact of a deterioration in
ﬁnancial intermediation.
We then provide a decomposition analysis of the ineﬃciencies involved with
bad banking. Let the ineﬃciency be measured by Lg − Lb. Assuming 0 <
15α < ˆ α < 1 and assumption 30, we can decompose Lg − Lb as follows:




















Note that the ﬁrst term within square brackets represents the pure ineﬃ-
ciency eﬀect of a switch from a good project to a bad project, the second term
within square brackets represents the ineﬃciency arising out of the fact that the
entrepreneur does not obtain the full value of the project with both the terms
being positive in sign.
One important aspect of this paper is what we call the endogenous supply
of deposits. The signiﬁcance of the latter is that endogeneity of deposits makes
the economy more sensitive to any change in the cost of intermediation. To see
why this is so, observe that any improvement in ﬁnancial intermediation, in an
economy characterized by α < ˆ α, will be accompanied by an increase in output
due to a shift in labor from self-employment to employment in the formal sector.
This happens in several stages. First, there is a direct eﬀect. Suppose that the
level of capital is exogenously kept constant at Kb. As α increases, i.e. as the
degree of bad banking falls, demand for labor in the formal sector increases.
This demand can be met by a release of labor from the self-employment sector.
This would be the only eﬀect in a model where capital supply is exogenous.
Recall, however, that the self-employed agents have endowment of capital
as well. When they get a job in the formal sector, they deposit their capital in
a bank. The latter makes it available to the entrepreneur. Observe that this
larger stock of capital with the entrepreneur will further increase the demand for
labor. This is the second stage. The process continues though in each successive
round, the change is smaller, till we have a new equilibrium.
Formally, it is shown in the appendix that the total increase in employment































(1) The ﬁrst term represents the straightforward eﬀect of an improvement
16in ﬁnancial intermediation. The larger the α i.e. the lower the cost of ﬁnancial
intermediation, the larger is the formal sector.
(2) The second term is the new eﬀect. This arises due to the endogeneity of
deposits. The latter expand because employment in the formal sector expands
(see the ﬁrst term).
(3) The remaining terms represent repercussions of the endogeneity of de-
posits. For example, the third term represents the eﬀect on deposits due to
expansion in employment which is covered in the second term.
(4) We have a convergent geometric progession series and the sum of the
eﬀects is given in the last expression.
(5) If ﬁnancial intermediation and employment were unrelated, then capi-
tal would have been given exogenously, in which case the process would have
stopped at the ﬁrst term in the above series.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, banking is bad, and
0 < α < ˆ α < 1. Then an increase in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation has
a greater adverse eﬀect on welfare if deposits are endogenous than if they are
exogenous.
So far we have seen how bad banking leads to ineﬃciency. Apart from the
fact that project B is chosen, bad banking has the eﬀect that it reduces the size
of the formal sector. Can we have a tax policy that can correct this distortion,
at least partially? We turn to this question in the next section.
4 Tax Policy and Bad Banking
In this section, we incorporate taxes on proﬁts. Let t be the tax rate on proﬁts.
We assume that only the veriﬁable income can be taxed. There is no tax on
the income of the self-employed agents, or on the capital or labor income of the
employees. Thus the entrepreneur must pay a tax of tmax{b(KL)
1
4 − wL −
rK,0}. Observe that in case of bankruptcy the ﬁrm does not have to pay any
taxes. We will use a variant of Assumption 4 to ensure that in equilibrium, the
bank does not have any non-performing asset.
Assumption 4
0
. b(1 − t) ≥ αp.
17In the previous section, we considered the general case i.e. L ≤ 1. In the
context of a developed country, it is reasonable to consider a corner solution
whereas in an LDC, typically, L < 1. Henceforth, we focus on the interior
solution. Formally, we will need the following parametric restriction for an
interior solution.
Assumption 5. b +
αp
1−t < 2s.
The entrepreneur’s decision problem is the same as before except that the





Let t∗ denote the optimal tax rate. Let the equilibrium level of capital and
labor be denoted by Kb(t) and Lb(t) respectively.




and 5 hold. The volume of ﬁnancial
intermediation Kb(t) is increasing in the tax-rate t. Furthermore, t∗ = 1 − α
and xb(t∗) < xg.
A higher tax rate tends to increase formal sector employment. Since there
is a tendency for formal sector employment to be low, up to a level, an increase
in taxes serves to counteract this eﬀect.
Thus we have the somewhat surprising result that an increase in taxes may
increase the size of the formal sector. The intuition is as follows. Note that
after simpliﬁcation the entrepreneur’s maximization problem simpliﬁes to maxL




2 − sL]. Thus as the tax rate increases, the private beneﬁt
becomes relatively more attractive for the entrepreneur (since the private beneﬁt
is not taxed). This leads to greater formal sector employment.
This result, however, needs to be treated with caution. First, note that if
the tax rate is too high (i.e. t > 1 − α) then the welfare level is decreasing in
t. Second, note that taxes can only rectify the problem of less than optimum
employment in the bad project. It can never ensure that the good project is
selected. Third, suppose that we consider a weaker deﬁnition of bad banking.
Suppose the bank management is bad in the sense that it does not prevent
the entrepreneur from choosing the bad project if she so desires, but the bank
management does not force the entrepreneur to choose the bad project. In such
a setup it is straightforward to show that if the tax rate is below a certain cut-oﬀ,
then the entrepreneur chooses the good project, otherwise she opts for the bad
18project. The intuition is that the bad project has some private beneﬁts which
are non-taxable. With the tax-rate becoming high, the bad project becomes
relatively more attractive.
5 Employment in Illegal Activity
In the previous section, we saw that taxation can not fully overcome the adverse
eﬀects of bad banking. In this section, we will argue that not only is tax not able
to overcome adverse aﬀects of banking, it may even make matters worse. Why?
This is because typically tax enforcement in LDCs is weak. This results in the
entrepreneurs shifting some economic activity to the informal sector where it
will not be taxed. To the extent that there is a social cost of operating illegally,
a tax policy can add to the distortion due to bad banking.
In this section, there are two diﬀerences with the earlier model. The ﬁrst
one lies in the way production is organized in the bad project. The bad project
consists of two sectors, legal and illegal. The production function in the legal
sector is denoted by B(K1L1)
1
4, where L1 and K1 denote, respectively, the labor
and capital employed in the legal sector. The production function in the illegal
sector is denoted by P(K2L2)
1
4, where L2 and K2 denote, respectively, the labor
and capital employed in the illegal sector. The bank manager gets her private




The second diﬀerence lies in the way tax is modelled in this version. Tax
evasion is a fact of life in many LDCs. We wish to model this aspect. For
analytical tractability, we choose the following formulation. We assume that
the entrepreneur can over-report the amount of labor and capital employed in
the veriﬁable sector, up to the aggregate capital and labor employed by her.
Since output is veriﬁable by assumption, she cannot under-report the output
produced in the legal sector. Let L = L1+L2 and K = K1+K2. Thus the total
tax-liability of the entrepreneur is given by min{t[B(K1L1)
1
4 −wL−rK],0}. To
ensure an interior solution (i.e. L < 1), we will impose the following condition.
Assumption 50. B + αP
(1−t) ≤ 2s.
We will see that the parametric restriction required to ensure zero NPAs is
(1 − t)B > αP. Formally, this is equivalent to
19Assumption 4
00
. t < t = 1 − αP
B .
Thus the tax rate is below a cutoﬀ level. This assumption will also ensure
that the taxable income is non-negative.
Unlike in the previous sections, now we need to consider employment and
capital in the legal, as well as in the illegal sector. Formally, given the choice
of bad project, the entrepreneur’s maximization problem is Formally, given the
choice of bad project, the entrepreneur’s maximization problem is
max
L1,L,K1,K
(1 − t) [B(K1L1)
1





s.t. L = K ≤ 1,
w + r ≥ s,
B(K1L1)
1
4 − wL − rK ≥ 0.
where the feasibility condition L = K ≤ 1 has been written as an inequality to
ensure that doing comparative statics is meaningful.
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 30,4
00
and 50 hold. Then output is produced
by the entrepreneur partly in the legal sector and partly in the illegal sector. The
input use in the legal sector is independent of t, whereas input use in the illegal
sector is increasing in t.
Note that the above proposition uncovers another problem of using ﬁscal
policies to compensate for bad banking. Since tax enforcement is weak, a higher
tax rate encourages the entrepreneur to shift production to the illegal sector to
evade taxes.
Moreover, as in the previous section we can consider a weak form of bad
banking where the bank management allows the entrepreneur to choose the
project independently. Again there is a cutoﬀ value of t such that the good
project is selected if and only if the tax rate is less than the cutoﬀ level.16
The policy implication is clear. In the short run, given the weakness in the
enforcement machinery, it is optimal to tax at a low rate. A higher rate will only
induce the entrepreneur to shift operations to the illegal sector. But in the long
run, the emphasis has to be on improving tax administration and enforcement
16This requires the condition that the bad project should not be too bad in the sense that
2B2 > g2.
20so that it is possible to shift to a high tax rate (if required) without impairing
eﬃciency.
6 The Eﬀect of Labor Laws
Our focus, in this paper, is on the role of ﬁnancial intermediation in the con-
text of employment in the formal sector. But any discussion of employment is
incomplete without the labor laws. The small size of the formal sector is often
attributed to labor laws. We turn to this issue in this section.
We will use a simple formulation of labor laws. Formally, let the wage rate
in the legal sector be w. We assume that w > s − r. Clearly, in equilibrium,
s − r = w, where w is the wage in the illegal sector, so that this condition
ensures that w > w. Labor laws decrease the proﬁts in the legal sector. So
there is an incentive to shift some activity to the illegal sector. But there is a
trade-oﬀ. There is a cost of operating in the illegal sector. This may be due
to the cost of hiding, bribing, and so on. So the entrepreneur seeks an optimal





2). We assume that there are zero NPAs and that there exists











and Lb,Kb ≤ 1, where Lb = Lb
1 + Lb
2 and Kb = Kb
1 + Kb
2. Observe that those
laborers who get a job in the legal sector are better oﬀ than other workers who
get a job in the illegal sector. Assume that there is rationing of jobs in the legal
sector and workers are chosen at random for the legal sector. Recall that the
participation constraint for the workers is w +r ≥ s. In equilibrium, this holds
with equality for the workers in the illegal sector, whereas for workers in the
legal sector, w + r > s.
In the previous section, we considered the case in which the government im-
posed tax laws and the entrepreneur operated in both the legal and the illegal
sector, but she included all the costs in the legal sector. So labor and capital
were treated symmetrically. Here again we assume that the entrepreneur pre-
tends that she is using all the capital in the legal sector. However, instead of
pretending that she is using all the labor in the legal sector (as in the previous
section), now she does not overstate the use of labor in the legal sector since
w > w. Ideally, she would like to understate the use of labor. But we assume
that she does not understate the use of labor in the legal sector though she does
21overstate the use of capital. This asymmetric formulation is motivated by the
following considerations. Firstly, there is a risk that laborers may leak out the
information if number of workers is understated in the legal sector. In the case
of capital, on the other hand, there is no similar risk. Secondly, it is easier to
overstate the use of capital because typically what is relevant is not the number
of machines but the value of machines. The latter is easier to overstate than the
number of machines. In the case of labor, on the other hand, it is the number
of laborers, which is relevant. And that is not easy to hide. So there is a ratio-
nale for asymmetric treatment of labor and capital. Formally, the optimization









s.t. K1 + K2 = L1 + L2. (14)
Proposition 6. Let Assumption 30 hold. With labor laws, the actual capital
intensity of production is higher in the legal sector as compared to that in the ille-




























2 > 0 and Lb,Kb ≤ 1.
The capital-labor ratio for the entrepreneur, K/L, always equals 1. Since the
actual capital intensity of production is higher in the legal sector as compared
to that in the illegal sector, clearly, we have K2
L2 < K
L = 1 < K1
L1 . So the formal
sector is more capital intensive than the informal sector. But the reported
capital intensity is K
L1. The latter is greater than K1
L1 , the actual intensity. So
while it is true that the formal sector is more capital intensive, this is possibly
exaggerated in the data.
In this paper, we have tried to examine an important issue viz. why is em-
ployment in the formal sector small? The purpose of this section is to demon-
strate that in the context of employment, there are some wrong perceptions.
High capital intensity is one of them. In the earlier sections, we have attempted
to show how it may be more meaningful to look for a solution to the employ-
ment problem in, what may seem to many, an unrelated factor viz. ﬁnancial
intermediation, rather than blame factors like capital intensity or even labor
laws beyond a point.
227 Conclusion
The eﬀect of a banking crisis on the real sector is a familiar theme in the recent
literature. In our model, we do not have the so called banking crises but there is,
nevertheless, a relationship between the banking sector and the real sector. We
demonstrate that an increase in the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation may result
in a shift of factors away from the (eﬃcient) formal sector to the (ineﬃcient)
informal sector. There is an ongoing misallocation of resources due to bad
banking (which is not connected with the more familiar moral hazard due to
deposit insurance in commercial banks). This problem, however, receives little
attention from the media and the policy makers. We hope this paper contributes
to the research on a persistent problem that is possibly even more serious than
the banking crises problem.
In this paper, we asked the question - Why is ﬁnancial intermediation low
despite safe banking? Our answer is as follows. An agent opts for the formal
sector if she has both a safe outlet for her wealth and a job. Safe banking only
ensures that there is a safe outlet for her wealth, but it does not ensure the
availability of a job. Clearly only those agents will participate in the formal
sector for whom both conditions are satisﬁed. But jobs are few. This is because
public sector banks have oﬃcials who are not really accountable and select bad
projects since they have opportunities for private beneﬁt from bad projects.
Thus banking may be safe but that is not enough. It also has to be sound
banking. The latter will increase formal sector employment which will in turn
increase deposits. The improvement has to go beyond ensuring that banks do
not have NPAs, which has been the focus recently. The government needs to
ensure that bank oﬃcials in public sector banks are competent, honest and
accountable. That will not only increase ﬁnancial intermediation, it will also
lead to more employment in the formal sector.
Our analysis suggests that it is important to reform the banking sector it-
self rather than try to use some corrective tax policy. In fact, tax policy can
make matters worse. Typically, in LDCs, tax enforcement is weak. This can
have perverse eﬀects. Taxation can encourage entrepreneurs to shift economic
activity underground. This results in an expansion of the informal sector.
We assumed that the entrepreneur is more eﬃcient than the self-employed
agents. The rationale is very clear. If it was the opposite, then, in equilibrium,
23we would have no ﬁnancial intermediation and no wage employment. All agents
would be self-employed and that would be an eﬃcient allocation. However, in
developed countries, typically there is considerable ﬁnancial intermediation and
formal sector employment. Going by the experience of these countries, it is clear
that the assumption, that self-employment is more eﬃcient than entrepreneurial
activity, is unrealistic. Hence it is meaningful to assume, as we have, that self-
employment is ineﬃcient relative to economic activity under an entrepreneur.
In this paper, we have tried to examine an important issue viz. why is
employment in the formal sector small in LDCs? In this context, there are
some wrong perceptions. High capital intensity in the formal sector is one of
them. We have attempted to show how it may be more meaningful to look
for a solution to the employment problem in, what may seem to many, an
unrelated factor viz. ﬁnancial intermediation, rather than blame factors like
capital intensity or even labor laws beyond a point.
24Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Since K = L, the ﬁrst order condition is (b +
αp)[fL(L,K) + fK(L,K)] ≥ s. Using Assumption 3 and K = L, we get 2(b +
αp)fL(L,L) ≥ s. Deﬁne ˆ α by the condition
2(b + ˆ αp)fL(1,1) = s. (15)
Clearly, the solution is given by
Lb =
(
1, if α > ˆ α
ˆ L, if α ≤ ˆ α,
where ˆ L is the interior solution, given implicitly by the condition 2(b +
αp)fL(L,L) = s. It is easy to check the following comparative statics result






> 0,α < ˆ α. (16)
It is also obvious that ∂L
b
∂α = 0,α > ˆ α. From equation (15), it follows that ˆ α =
s−2bfL(1,1)
2pfL(1,1) . Clearly, 0 < ˆ α < 1 ⇔ s1 ≡ 2bfL(1,1) < s < 2(b + p)fL(1,1) ≡ s2.
Consider next the output in the economy. It is the sum of output produced in
the formal and in the informal sector. Formally, in equilibrium,
xb = (b + p)f(Lb,Kb) + (1 − Lb)s
Since Lb = Kb and fL = fK, we have
∂x
b
∂α = [2(b + p)fL(Lb,Kb) − s]∂L
b
∂α ≥ [2(b + p)fL(1,1) − s]∂L
b
∂α > 0
where the ﬁrst inequality holds after using assumption 3 and the second









α[−(fLL+fLK)] > 0, if α < ˆ α,
After using Assumption 3
0









This implies that ∂
2x
b
∂s∂α < 0,α < ˆ α. Finally, Assumption 4 ensures that the zero
NPA condition (6) is satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given that α < ˆ α, the ﬁrst order condition is
2(b + αp)fL(L,L) = s. Suppose that K is ﬁxed at Kb to begin with. Then a
simple comparative statics exercise shows that the (ﬁrst round) eﬀect on labor,





dα > 0 where the inequality sign
25follows from Assumption 3. But clearly this is not equilibrium since capital
is now less than labor. In equilibrium, we require that the change in capital
is equal to the change in labor (since K = L). But an increase in capital
will further increase the demand for labor. From the ﬁrst order condition,
for a given (b,α,p,s), we have fLLdL + fLKdK = 0. This implies that the













dα, since the change in capital is equal to the change
in labor in the previous round. Observe that the process does not stop at this.
The second round increase in employment in the formal sector leads to a further
increase in deposits since deposits come from agents that have jobs. But deposits
are passed on by the bank to the entrepreneur who has larger capital to use in
production. So we have a further increase in capital which again increases the
demand for labor. This process gets repeated ad inﬁnitum. Note that this is a





< 1 by assumption 3. The total increase in































Proof of Proposition 4. Since K = L and w + r = s, the entrepreneur’s









4 − sL ≥ 0. (17)
To begin with assume that there is no bankruptcy in equilibrium. In that
case the entrepreneur’s problem simpliﬁes to the following
max
L
(1 − t)[b bL
1
2 − sL], (18)
where b b ≡ b+
αp
1−t. Solving we obtain Lb = Kb =
b b
2




πb(t) denote the optimal proﬁt. The bank management has a private beneﬁt of
(1−α)
pb b
2s. Note that the proﬁt of the bank is zero and that Lb,Kb does not lead
to bankruptcy provided the veriﬁable income is suﬃcient to cover the rental
and the wage bills i.e. if b(Lb)
1
2 −sLb ≥ 0. This simpliﬁes to the condition that
b ≥
αp
1−t, which, given assumption 4
0
, is satisﬁed.
26Next we use Lb = Kb =
b b
2
4s2 in xb = (b + p)f(Kb,Lb) + (1 − Lb)s (see (11))
and take ∂x
b
∂t = 0. It is easy to check that this last condition gives the optimal
tax rate to be (1 − α). Using t = 1 − α in Lb = Kb =
b b
2
4s2, and thereafter using
the latter in xb = (b+p)f(Kb,Lb)+(1−Lb)s, we get xb(t∗). It is easy to check
that xb(t∗) < xg, where xg is given by (11).
Proof of Proposition 5. To begin with we ignore the feasibility condition





4 − wL1 − rK1] + [αP(K2L2)
1
4 − wL2 − rK2]
−t[B(K1L1)
1
4 − wL1 − wL2 − rK1 − rK2]
−λ[ L1 + L2 − K1 − K2].
From ∂Z
∂L1 = 0 and ∂Z




















∂K1 = 0 and ∂Z



















From (19) and (20), we get L1
L2 = K1
K2. Given that L1 + L2 = K1 + K2, it now
follows that in equilibrium L1 = K1 and L2 = K2. Thus the entrepreneur’s
decision problem (ignoring the non-negativity constraint on taxable income)





2 − sL1] + [αPL2
1
2 − s(1 − t)L2].
Solving, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium L1 = K1 = B
2











4s(1−t). It is easy to check that in equilibrium the taxable
income is non-negative provided t < 1 − αP
B , which, given assumption 4
00
, is
always satisﬁed. Clearly, given Assumption 50, L < 1.





4 − wL1 − rK1]
+[αP(K2L2)
1
4 − wL2 − r K2]
+λ[ K1 + K2 − L1 − L2].
From ∂Z
∂K1 = 0 and ∂Z
















∂L1 = 0 and ∂Z















after using w > w. From (21) and (22), we get K2
L2 < K1
L1 . Finally, since the re-
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